












 5 The rights of foreign intelligence 
targets 
 Michael Skerker 
Liberal states are dedicated to the protection of human rights but protecting the rights
of their citizens may entail infringing upon or violating the rights of foreign citizens.
This is what some call the liberal dilemma of intelligence collection ( Omand and
Phythian 2018 ;  Gendron 2005 , 418). The same is true for military operations, but in
many cases, wars are avoidable, at least in principle, through deterrence and diplo-
matic actions. Yet intelligence gathering, by its very nature, must be ongoing, in part
to forestall wars. If a state can build weapons of war with a reasonable hope that they
will not be used and train military personnel with a reasonable hope they will not be
deployed, the same is not true for intelligence-gathering equipment and personnel.1 
In what follows, I articulate a cosmopolitan model for just intelligence collec-
tion directing all states with a certain character to adhere to the same norms when 
and if they engage in intelligence collection. This chapter focuses on signals intel-
ligence, SIGINT, and image analysis intelligence, IMAGINT. The model ulti-
mately cautions states to be conservative in their intelligence-gathering efforts. All 
states of a certain character are permitted to engage in the most rights-respecting, 
most efficacious techniques they have at their disposal. Given the range of techni-
cal abilities of different states, a state with discriminate, sophisticated means of 
intelligence gathering must consider if its citizens can tolerate the cruder, less 
discriminate retaliatory operations an adversary state might employ. 
Foundation for a theory of just intelligence 
This section develops the foundation of a cosmopolitan theory of just intelli-
gence collection. I develop it in detail elsewhere ( Skerker 2020b ;  2019 ;  2016 ). 
In brief, people living in groups have collective moral responsibilities to protect 
and address other people’s rights that can only be consistently and reliably met 
through coordinated action. Typically, these collective moral responsibilities are 
partially acquitted by creating and supporting institutions to address the relevant 
rights, like schools, hospitals, businesses, churches and militaries. These insti-
tutions are essentially outcome-oriented, set up to foster, create and protect the 
collective moral goods (e.g. health, education, security) that protect rights and 
fulfil morally important needs. Once these institutions exist, the collective moral 
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The professionals who work in morally vital institutions meet their collective 
moral responsibilities in part by adhering to their properly constituted professional 
norms. Since these institutions are created to acquit collective moral responsibili-
ties, professionals have a moral – and not just a professional or legal – duty to 
comply with their professional imperatives to accomplish their institutions’ char-
acteristic ends. The relevant duties are moral duties since actors’ norm-guided 
actions help their institutions meet, foster and protect people’s rights. 
Professional norms are chiefly ends-oriented, directing the professional to take 
steps that bring about their institutions’ characteristic ends for their clients: edu-
cation, justice, health, security etc. Professional norms are also constrained by 
deontological concerns reflecting ex ante rules winning the hypothetical consent 
of all affected by the professionals’ actions. These constraints specify how the 
institutional imperatives are to be met, guided by stakeholders’ presumed aversion 
to being grossly wronged in some areas while being assisted in others.2 
Professional norms  
Certain state agents have a professional duty to meet the collective moral right 
of security for their political entities, but this duty is too vague to be action-guid-
ing. We can take advantage of the criterion of universalizability inherent in most 
schemes of rights and duties to further delineate relevant professional duties. We
can consider if everyone affected by a potential tactic or norm (norms can be seen 
as rules for generating tactics)3 would endorse it for meeting their interests and 
protecting their rights. Those affected would include three stake-holding groups 
for any professional action in an adversarial field (like policing, soldiering, law, 
or intelligence): the professionals themselves, their “targets” and their clients. In 
the abstract, we can see that these groups would endorse tactics and norms strik-
ing an optimal balance between being practically efficacious and rights respect-
ing for all concerned. Any member of the stake-holding groups can be expected 
to endorse professional norms and tactics that efficiently and reliably lead to the 
characteristic end of their professions like security, but in a way that minimizes 
rights violations along the way. This trade off can be expressed by the adage 
“the cure shouldn’t be worse than the disease”. The preferred moral framework 
I call the “security standard” identifies norms and tactics rationally worthy of 
consent by the three stake-holding groups. It endorses norms and tactics surviving 
a three-stage winnowing process. In the context of security-seeking professions, 
the standard 1) canvases locally feasible tactics aimed at securing an environment 
relatively free of rights violations or the threat thereof 2) isolates the most reli-
able, efficacious, proportional and efficient tactics of those locally feasible and 
3) endorses the most rights-respecting among the tactics meeting the practical 
metrics of 2). 
Before proceeding, let me address some potential methodological ques-
tions. Hypothetical consent is sometimes criticized for being inadequate to 
ground norms or obligations. I am not arguing that intelligence gathering norms 
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responsibilities. The hypothetical consent of all stakeholders is modelled to 
delineate the contours of these norms. Hypothetical consent is also sometimes 
criticized as a theoretical flourish adding nothing to what a theorist happens 
to find compelling. A hypothetical consent model  is apt for crafting norms for 
national security actors because the theorist cannot say ahead of time which kind 
of professional norms and tactics in the security sphere are best for all political 
entities in all times. There are two contingent variables affecting national secu-
rity that have to be taken into account: available tactics and the current level of 
danger. The first element of the security standard canvasses locally feasible tac-
tics. Best practices for certain kinds of intelligence operations will shift over time 
as technology improves, social science makes breakthroughs and tactical experi-
ence expands, so what is consent-worthy for being a state-of-the-art intelligence-
gathering method one year may be outmoded years later. Agencies also develop 
insights at different paces, so state A’s intelligence apparatus can be faulted for 
using relatively unreliable or ineffective techniques already abandoned by other 
states, provided that these better techniques are economically and technically 
feasible for state A. Thus, element 2 of the security standard seeks the most 
practically effective norms and tactics that are currently employed somewhere 
in the world, and demands, effectively, that our political entity practice the state 
of the art, or as close to it, as is technologically or economically possible for it 
(further, since the security standard endorses the best norms and tactics, it places 
constant pressure on state agents to refine their capabilities). A second reason 
that different norms and tactics might be consent-worthy in different states is 
that more aggressive security-seeking tactics or less deferential norms might be 
consent-worthy in times of great danger. 
The clients of intelligence officers – the inhabitants of their state – have a posi-
tive right to security. Therefore, they can demand their agents deliver that security. 
Intelligence officers can model their clients’ consent to the most efficacious norms 
and tactics to that end. Their concerns would not be limited to efficacy, but also 
take into account reliability and efficiency. Since any kind of professional action 
might also produce negative effects, proportionality is also important to consider. 
An intelligence officer has no rational grounds to think a generic client would 
endorse relatively ineffective, inefficient, unreliable and disproportionate norms 
and tactics when better ones exist. No doubt some techniques (or norms encom-
passing tactics and techniques) will be more efficient, but less reliable or more 
efficacious, but less proportionate etc. so we can imagine an overall net “value 
score” of these four practical elements answering the question “what norm or 
tactic works best”. Still, the norm or tactic best conducing to security is not neces-
sarily consent-worthy. Among a class of high-scoring norms or tactics, those that 
are the most rights-respecting are most worthy of consent on account of clients’
duties to respect the rights of foreigners and their own intelligence professionals 
and because of clients’ interests in being exposed to the least rights-infringing 
tactics on the part of foreign adversaries. 
This rights-respecting element will itself be the product of an optimal balanc-
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security will be largely met with practically efficacious norms and tactics that 
actually do conduce to protect security. These norms and tactics may have to 
be modified from the highest levels of efficacy or efficiency in deference to the 
rights of the targets as well as the state agents implementing them. While tar-
gets of given actions can also be the clients of the same actions when they are 
wielded by their own domestic intelligence agencies, qua target, their interest 
would be to be exposed to no intelligence collection. Barring that, their interest 
is in being exposed to the most minimal, necessary and discriminate types of 
collection, meaning that qua target, they would endorse the most reliable, effec-
tive, efficient and proportionate measures, infringing on as few as their rights as 
possible. Intelligence collectors should spend no more time or collect no more 
information than is necessary. When it comes to inter-state intelligence collection, 
it is in the interest of the client in one state to endorse the most minimal and dis-
criminate actions targeting foreigners, because as we will see in the next section, 
she implicitly endorses those same tactics being used against herself by foreign 
intelligence agencies. 
Regarding the third stake-holding group, state agents have a right not to be 
ordered to perform actions exposing themselves to wanton risk or threatening 
their long-term mental, moral and physical health ( Skerker 2020a ). For example, 
intelligence officers can probably never be ordered to have sexual relations with 
targets or to cultivate drug addiction in the course of undercover work. 
Thus, acceptable norms and tactics may vary if we take into account rights and 
not merely the efficacy of the norms and tactics. They may also vary if the rights 
of all three stake-holding groups are taken into account as opposed to the rights 
of just one. Examples will be given in a later section. The triangulation of rights 
is in the interests of all since any given person might at some point occupy all 
stake-holding groups. A person might be a state agent for some span of her life; 
be targeted by a foreign intelligence agency and be the recipient of the security 
provided by other state agents. 
Forfeiting, Waiving, and Ceding Rights 
Just because an institutional actor has a duty to do something it does not mean 
she is not wronging her target/client in executing her duty in a norm-compliant 
way. For example, a doctor has a duty to preserve people’s health and must adhere 
to certain norms and tactics balancing healthy outcomes with respect to patients’
rights. Just the same, she may not examine someone in a non-emergency situation 
unless the patient consents. The patient’s consent waives claim rights that would 
otherwise make it morally wrong for the doctor to touch or probe the patient’s 
body. A previous section concluded that security standard-compliant norms and 
tactics will respect the rights of all three stake-holding groups involved with 
intelligence collection. We now need to discuss which rights these groups enjoy. 
We will focus on how targets and non-targets (whose information might be acci-
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One temporarily forfeits certain rights when one acts unjustly and another party 
acting in self- or other-defence needs to materially infringe on those rights to halt 
the unjust action or threat. So, for example, an unprivileged irregular militant, 
bent on committing acts of terrorism, forfeits privacy rights to his operational 
communications if intelligence agencies need to intercept his communications in 
order to interrupt his plots. 
Some intelligence targets like national security actors waive rights that would 
otherwise morally inhibit intelligence agencies from targeting them for collec-
tion. One might expressly waive a claim-right to another person, giving her a 
liberty-right to act in a way that would otherwise violate the rights of the person 
who ceded the right, as when a patient cedes a right to a doctor to touch his body. 
Service personnel arguably waive claim-rights against being attacked to future 
conventional enemies when they enlist in the armed forces, extending permission 
to enemy service personnel to try and attack them in war-time. 4 
Most non-targets of collateral intelligence collection do not waive their relevant 
rights. Some cede relevant rights though. Again, one can  waive rights through 
express consent or tacit consent.5 Ceding rights can come as part of being duty 
bound. A duty to deliver X to Y means one cedes a claim-right for X to Y. One 
could not, for example, object if Y took proportionate means to seize X if one 
did not voluntarily do one’s duty and deliver it. One might have a duty to deliver 
something to someone in the context of a particular practice like a game, but more 
often, one has duties outside of particular practices one voluntarily enters. 
One owes a duty to uphold just institutions to the inhabitants of a state and 
directly expresses the duty to the government employees who are those inhabit-
ants’ agents. A duty to uphold just institutions means ceding claim-rights against 
state agents 1) when those agents are competently pursuing their professional 
obligations and duties and 2) when insisting on those rights would prevent state 
agents from serving their principals. This ceding of claim-rights gives the state 
agents liberty-rights in turn, creating the space for them to perform their norm-
compliant actions without wronging the affected parties. So, for example, domes-
tically, a person’s duty to uphold just institutions means he cedes claim-rights 
against having his liberty curtailed by competent police hewing to due process 
protocols in the event that evidence implicates him of a crime. One does not cede 
claim-rights to professionals acting in violation of their professional norms or 
incompetently executing their norms. 
The duty to support just institutions is not restricted to institutions of one’s own 
state, but extends in different ways to foreign institutions. The duty to support 
just institutions is based on the duty to protect the rights of other human beings, a 
cosmopolitan duty which is unaffected by the nationality of the recipient. So, for 
example, one cedes claim- and liberty-rights to the state agents of a foreign state 
one visits as a tourist when insisting on those rights would prevent foreign agents 
from permissibly performing their duties to protect their own citizens, residents 
and guests (e.g. tourists). 
Normally, the duty to support just institutions does not require one to do any-
thing for state B when one is residing in state A. 6 That said, one should usually 
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cooperate with foreign law enforcement officers if one can provide information 
about a crime committed abroad. This is an expression of the cosmopolitan duty 
to help protect other people’s rights. The foreign law enforcement effort may also 
protect oneself in the case of international crime like drug trafficking or terrorism. 
This claim may not be too controversial. When it comes to another state’s  adver-
sarial actions against one’s own state, the duty to support just institutions owed 
foreigners even entails ceding certain claim-rights against foreign national security 
agents who are acting according to their professional duty. The scope of this rights-
ceding is set, on the restrictive side, by the security standard, and on the permissive 
side, by 1) what is necessary for adversary agencies to keep their people safe and 
2) what intelligence actions the rights-ceder can be modelled as accepting. 7 
On the restrictive side, inhabitants of one state can object to the actions of  
an adversary agency that fail the security standard, for example, if the agency 
is employing norms and tactics that are more unreliable, disproportionate, inef-
fective, inefficacious and rights infringing than alternatives the agency has at its 
disposal. Agencies cannot be criticized for using the best technology they can 
afford, even if it is less sophisticated than the technology used by the inhabitants 
of the targeted state. They can be criticized for failing to train in state-of-the-art 
tradecraft that is based on open-source information and not dependent on technol-
ogy. Again, the duty to support just institutions does not justify the behaviour of 
corrupt or incompetent adversary agents. 
On the permissive side, inhabitants of one state have a duty to support the  
just institutions of other states, which entails ceding the claim-rights necessary 
to create the moral permission for adversaries to keep their clients safe. At base, 
this permission will cover what are essentially investigative efforts to identify 
security threats. These actions include  diagnostic collection efforts designed to 
anticipate threats. 8 We will assume that intelligence gathering will involve  acci-
dental or foreseen but unintentional (i.e.  collateral ) collection on people who are 
not security risks to the collecting agency’s state (e.g. caught in communication 
with the legitimate target). One cedes claim-rights against  accidental collection, 
because if agencies cannot act where there is a risk of collecting or surveilling 
a mistakenly targeted person, they cannot act at all. It may seem odd to cede a 
claim-right against an accidental action since the party to which the right is ceded 
cannot intentionally perform an accidental action. What this ceding involves is 
really an acknowledgement that the agent would not be considered to have acted 
negligently when an agency accidentally collects on an innocent party. Civilians’ 
duty to support just (foreign) institutions does not directly address  collateral col-
lection; this has to be justified via a waiver, discussed later. The ceding of rights 
associated with the duty to support just institutions is also not the main justifica-
tion for  direct and sustained targeting for collection because agencies should only 
be doing that against security threats to their states and those targets will have 
either waived or forfeited rights. Given what was just said about accidental col-
lection, innocent parties are not wronged when an agency mistakenly targets them 
with direct collection efforts and then breaks off collection and purges the relevant 
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Ceding certain claim-rights that enable foreign intelligence officers to engage 
in collective efforts that might accidentally or diagnostically collect the informa-
tion of an innocent person is part of that person’s duty to support just foreign 
institutions protecting foreigners’ rights. The scope of adversary permissions can 
also be widened or restricted based on waivers inhabitants of particular states can 
be modelled as making. These waivers may also simply reiterate the minimal 
permissions based on the duty to support just institutions. 
One waives certain claim-rights when one enters into a permissible, adversarial 
practice. For example, a boxer waives his right against being hit when he engages 
in a bout. This dynamic also applies if one’s adversarial practice is mediated by 
an agent, as in a lawsuit. When one sues someone, one engages a lawyer to try to 
seize some of the defendant’s property or limit her rights. One cannot begrudge 
the target of one’s lawsuit hiring a lawyer to defend her interests in turn. The 
defendant might after all be in the right or the degree of her wrong-doing may 
be contestable. By contrast, one cedes no rights to the agent of a fully culpable 
wrong-doer if one hires an agent to protect one’s rights and interests. A gangster 
may not hire a gunman to bolster his offense against the bodyguard of an innocent 
person whom the gangster threatened. 
So a foreign state agent’s actions are potentially justified indirectly, as a recip-
rocal entailment of a client consenting to his own agents’ outward-facing actions. 
If the inhabitants of state A retained claim-rights against being collaterally, diag-
nostically or accidentally collected on, then intelligence agencies of state B could 
not permissibly engage in the same protective function inhabitantsA have a right 
to demand of (their own) agencies. This is to say that inhabitants B could not have 
their moral right to security met to the same degree that inhabitantsA have their 
right met. 
One cannot complain if one is targeted with the same collection tactics one 
wants one’s own agencies to use against foreigners. Since all have the right to 
protection by their intelligence agencies, consent-worthy intelligence gathering 
norms and tactics, like consent-worthy legal norms, will be those that are accept-
able to all sides equally. They have to be acceptable to one as a client or a target. 
Agency leaders can model their clients’ consent to collection practices at two 
junctures. First, on the permissive side of the equation, they can ask, what action 
does securing national security against a particular adversary demand, given the 
current bilateral situation? Second, on the limiting side of the equation, they can 
ask, what kind of reciprocal response would clients tolerate? Answers to the sec-
ond question may eliminate norms and tactics suggested by answers to the first 
question. 
Unlike diagnostic and accidental collection, collateral collection is only justi-
fied via a waiver consequent to entering into an agent-mediated adversarial prac-
tice. Imagine that a bodyguard can only defend his principal by shooting at an 
unjust attacker in a way that endangers an innocent bystander. The bystander has 
a duty to try to rescue endangered innocent people, but not at the cost of her life. 
We have no grounds to say she would not be wronged if she is injured in the cross-
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that the bystander has ceded claim-rights against being collaterally harmed. We
could say principals have waived rights against being exposed to collateral harm 
if everyone had a bodyguard and bodyguards protected their principals against 
both unjust attackers and other bodyguards. By hiring a bodyguard, one would be 
entering into a quasi-adversarial, agent-mediated practice. By parity of reasoning, 
we can say that agency leaders can model their clients’ waivers of rights against 
collateral collection if they also model them as endorsing their intelligence offi-
cers engaging in collection efforts that might collaterally collect on foreigners. 
The agents of such an agency act permissibly when they collect their innocent 
persons’ communications as a side effect of targeting someone with whom the 
innocent person communicates. Agency leaders can model this consent if and so 
long as it is technologically impossible to only collect one half of a conversation 
or textual exchange. 
The reflexivity of this model should encourage a conservative attitude towards 
intelligence collection. We must ask on behalf of the model consenter if she can 
consent to her state agents using tactics abroad that, via the principle of reciproc-
ity, she must also permit foreign agents to use against her. As will be argued later, 
this reflexive question also applies to intelligence officers concerning the means 
and extent to which they are willing to be targeted or have their relatives targeted. 
Just intelligence-gathering tactics 
Using this reciprocal approach, the rule of thumb should be that security agen-
cies should use the same collection tactics abroad on non-government agents that 
they use domestically. For example, if the security standard indicates that war-
rants issued by judges are necessary for a security service to intercept a particular 
domestic inhabitant’s communications or that a domestic criminal suspect has to 
be warned about a right to remain silent in police interrogation, the same treat-
ment should apply to a foreigner targeted by the security service. Let us now con-
sider several considerations that will present caveats to that rule of thumb. These 
considerations will argue for an expansion of intelligence collection powers. The 
second half of this section will consider the rights of different intelligence targets 
and non-targets, which largely constrain intelligence activities. 
Practical limitations on foreign agents acting abroad or the different nature 
of the target might suggest different tactics leading to greater infringements on 
the target’s rights. Police may be able to conduct line-of-sight surveillance of 
suspects with undercover officers, whereas such intimate operations may not be 
feasible against certain foreign targets, particularly in harsh terrain or repressive 
countries. Long-distance imaging and SIGINT technology may lead to less dis-
criminate operations than domestic operations (e.g. a satellite image can cover a 
huge footprint compared to what an undercover agent can see). To say this more 
privacy-infringing tactic is consent-worthy under the security standard is to say 
the model consenter permits her adversary’s security agencies to attempt the same 
in her country. 9 While this reciprocity is hard to imagine in some asymmetrical 
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(FATA), but anti-Pakistan government irregulars do not train in Vermont – there 
are plenty of peer state rivalries in which reciprocal scenarios are more likely. 
A further disanalogy between foreign intelligence operations and domestic law 
enforcement presents an additional complication. By their nature, intelligence 
operations are prophylactic, dealing with prospective threats. An intelligence 
agency might not be adequately vigilant if it only gathered intelligence on known 
intelligence targets. To anticipate threats or discover new leads, intelligence agen-
cies might wish to engage in bulk data interception and use automated searches 
to scan the content of the messages or scan the metadata for suspicious patterns 
or contacts between new numbers and known intelligence targets. Yet this kind 
of prospective action violates due process in that the target’s privacy is infringed 
prior to evidence of wrong-doing. This form of collection can be made more sen-
sitive to the targets’ rights by automating the collection process so that a human 
analyst only reads or listens to an intercept if there is a high likelihood of its intel-
ligence value, but this is still a significant departure from the standard balance of 
power between liberal state and citizen. We will need to consider if the security 
risks for inhabitants of one state are sufficiently grave that they can be modelled 
by agency leaders as endorsing the risk of being reciprocally targeted by adver-
sary states’ dragnet intelligence operations (more in the following). 
A third qualification is that reciprocity is necessarily with respect to intelligence 
function rather than the technological expression of that function. An endorsement 
of intelligence agencyA’s diagnostic collection including broad satellite coverage, 
selector-guided data intercepts and bulk data collection would permit adversary 
agencyB’s similar diagnostic measures. Yet a wide range of concrete practices 
could be justified if the security standard permits security services to conduct 
foreign operations employing the most reliable, efficient, rights-respecting etc. 
tactics available to the service within a given function area. The best locally avail-
able tactics justified by the security service will vary depending on a given politi-
cal entity’s wealth, size, technological prowess and ingenuity. If the standard then 
effectively permits all security actors to “do their best”, the standard allows situ-
ations in which, for example, wealthy country A’s intelligence services can con-
duct very discriminate, sophisticated, targeted and automated intercepts of foreign 
intelligence target’s communications – so that very few innocent people have their 
privacy infringed or violated – while also permitting poor country B’s intelligence 
services to conduct relatively crude, indiscriminate intercepts that infringe on the 
privacy of far more innocent people. For example, the 2006 film The Lives of Oth-
ers depicts 1980s era Stasi agents steaming open random East German citizens’
letters in order to see if they contained any subversive content. This method of 
intercept is obviously far more invasive than an automated system that only saves 
communications with specific selectors for human analysis. So the leaders of 
technologically sophisticated agencyA, considering targeted intercepts of foreign 
expatsB on A’s soil, would need to consider if their relatively backward adversary 
in state B will reciprocally respond by steaming open the mail or listening to all 
the phone conversations of expatsA in state B. Thus, intelligence collection activi-
ties fail the security standard in particular instances if one state’s adversary’s best 
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methods of intelligence collection are so crude as to be imagined to be intolerable 
to the inhabitants of the target state. In this case, intelligence officers would need 
to refrain from collecting from a certain state if they could anticipate that the state 
would retaliate by engaging in its crude collection methods (political entities with 
more sophisticated adversaries would not encounter this problem). That said, it 
is difficult to think of an example of SIGINT that would be so rights-infringing 
as to be intolerable for any state to suffer at the hands of its dangerous adversary 
if that was the price of garnering signals intelligence. One’s tolerance of risk is 
influenced by the nature of the harm the risky activity forestalls. Crude forms of 
SIGINT might be intolerable if the reward for the risk was lower, such as if the 
target state did not pose a military threat to the collector state. 
One might wonder if any states enjoy a unilateral right to collect against adver-
saries because of the illegitimate nature of the target government. As mentioned 
earlier, one can hire a bodyguard if threatened by a gangster, but the gangster does 
not have a right to hire extra gunmen in response. Since the security standard is 
indexed to the protection of negative liberty, it justifies traditional policing and 
national security actions of even some illiberal and/or autocratic states. While 
the security standard does not justify repressive actions aimed at a government’s 
non-violent political or ideological opponents, it does justify the bread-and-butter 
responsibilities of a state aimed at protecting its inhabitants from street crime, 
piracy, terrorism and foreign military attack. I will follow John Rawls’s usage 
referring to states that do this as well as provide internal law and order in a mostly 
egalitarian manner as “decent states” (I will refer to states, but it could also be the 
case that a political entity within an internationally recognized state might have 
significant autonomy and protect its inhabitants from external threats). Hence, 
Russia, China and Iran, for example, have the right to engage in foreign intel-
ligence operations as a means of defending their people against foreign military 
attack and intelligence collection. The security actions autocratic states may 
legitimately engage in to protect their people also protect the autocratic regimes, 
which, in other moments, may repress their own people. Internal repression has 
to reach a high level to remove hypothetical consent to a state’s national security 
operations. Under these conditions, foreign invasion would be rationally pref-
erable to the perseverance of the repressive regime. The security standard does 
not justify the coercive actions of states with governments that largely neglect 
ordinary inhabitants and use power largely to benefit a ruling clique. Such gov-
ernments are virtually indistinguishable from criminal gangs. I will refer to these 
as unjust states. 
The security standard prefers the most rights-respecting out of the most practi-
cally efficacious tactics and norms that are locally feasible. We therefore have to 
consider the scope of intelligence targets’ rights, applying the justifications for 
intelligence operations to specific categories of targets. In order to accomplish 
this aim, we have to consider both the target and the context for collection. Any 
SIGINT or IMAGINT operation will involve three major relevant variables: the 
collecting agency, the target and the agency with defensive jurisdiction over the 
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with their adversaries; agencies with greater abilities than their adversaries and 
those with lesser abilities. There may also be situations where a target is in a failed 
or unjust state and has no intelligence agency acting on his behalf. In all the cases 
where a functioning and responsible agency exists, the collecting agency has to 
consider if the defending agency’s retaliation or reciprocal actions are tolerable 
for the collecting agency’s own citizens given the overall threat environment. This 
concern will likely be readily addressed in the affirmative if the collecting agency 
is technologically or operationally inferior to its adversary since there is a good 
likelihood that the adversary’s relatively discriminate reciprocal response will be 
tolerable to the collecting agency’s citizens (obviously, this would not be the case 
if both agencies were operating on a very crude level and one was only slightly 
more sophisticated than its rival). The situation facing inhabitants of failed and 
unjust states will be addressed at the end of this section. 
I would suggest there are seven relevant categories of intelligence targets: 
1 a positively identified foreign intelligence officer or service member 
2 a suspected foreign intelligence or military agent (the latter might be 
non-uniformed) 
3 a non-specific target, for example a random person collected against in drag-
net fashion 
4 a civilian of intelligence value, for example a politician, bureaucrat, engineer 
or scientist 
5 the relative, lover, colleague or friend of 1–4 
6 a positively identified unprivileged irregular, for example a member of a ter-
rorist group 
7 a suspected unprivileged irregular 
People have rights to privacy which presumptively cover professional commu-
nications. Certainly, it is wrong for professors, doctors, accountants, priests etc. 
to hack each other’s professional correspondence. Adversary military, privileged 
irregular combatant or intelligence personnel in decent states have a right to com-
municate their operational plans with colleagues since (according to the tradi-
tional post-Westphalian just war tradition) these professionals do nothing legally 
or morally wrong in pursuing national security goals. Yet since their adversaries 
have the same right to pursue the national security goals of their own political 
entities, those adversaries can engage in strategic behaviour such as intercept-
ing their enemy’s communications. 10 National security actors waive their rights 
against having their operational communications intercepted when they join their 
organizations since they know the parameters of the profession include commu-
nication interceptions. Further, assuming that the operationally significant infor-
mation collected regards state secrets, foreign security personnel do not suffer 
personal privacy violations when their communications are intercepted. The pro-
fessional secrets are in a sense, state property, like military materiel. Waiving 
claim-rights against being targeted with collection efforts is not the same thing as 
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to attempt to conceal the information. Intelligence officers can take steps to safe-
guard their communications and resist intrusions. Waiving claim-rights against 
being targeted with collection efforts does not entail a requirement to volunteer 
the relevant information any more than waiving a claim-right against being struck 
in a boxing match means a boxer must refrain from ducking. 
Intelligence agencies will often want to collect personal information about their 
state agent target. The recruitment of intelligence assets from within military and 
intelligence agencies sometimes occurs when recruiting agents identify vulner-
abilities or dissatisfactions on the part of their targets. Further, many intelligence 
officers work undercover. One way to identify undercover agents is to closely 
monitor their communications and examine the documents associated with their 
“legends”. Certainly, intelligence officers know how their game is played, so 
voluntary entrance into the profession, where they are trained about informa-
tion security and the professional perils of personal foibles, can be understood as 
amounting to a waiving of a claim-right against having their personal information 
being targeted by adversary collectors. 
There is a greater separation between public and private for service person-
nel than for intelligence officers. Going to work for service personnel may mean 
physically deploying to a different country or to sea. Stateside service personnel 
conduct most of their professional work on bases in uniform using unique military 
materiél and using specially secured communication and data storage devices. So 
there is usually a physical and social separation between professional and per-
sonal lives. Unlike civilian intelligence officers, service members can readily do 
their jobs in most cases without intercepting their adversaries’ private commu-
nications or information. Further, in most cases, their job is overt; unlike many 
intelligence officers, they present themselves as service personnel while working. 
So the personal communication and data storage of service personnel per se are 
usually irrelevant to adversaries; it does not relate to national security and does 
not identify a service member’s true profession. Yet service members’ personal 
information can be turned into a vulnerability through their own indiscretions. 
Damaging information is of interest to adversary agencies as it can make service 
personnel vulnerable to recruitment. 
I do not think that it is permissible as a matter of course for adversaries to target 
all the private communications of service personnel and hack all their personal 
data files looking for leverage. Militaries need to recruit relatively large number 
of people. Enlistees know of course that they will be physically vulnerable to ene-
mies in the event of war (which statistically, they may well avoid during their time 
of service). Since intelligence collection is prophylactic, agencies would want to 
collect potential blackmail material against service personnel from potential future 
adversaries as soon as they enter the military. It seems unrealistic to think that 
many potential enlistees would be willing to enlist if they knew that all potential 
adversaries would be invading their privacy as a matter of course and that unlike 
intelligence officers, they would not have the advantage of clandestine identities 
to shield them from adversaries’ attention. So, unlike intelligence officers, who 
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clandestine identities, it does not seem reasonable to think enlistees waive a right 
to all their personal information to foreign adversaries. Leaders of intelligence 
agencies would also have to consider the effect on military recruitment if this kind 
of information collection became the new normal, brought about in part through 
their universal collection of their adversary military’s personal information. 
Finally, like intelligence officers, privileged irregular militants engaging in 
guerrilla tactics typically hide in plain sight by presenting themselves as ordinary 
civilians when not engaged in operations. Since they dress as, and live among, 
non-combatant civilians, they cannot begrudge their conventional adversaries 
engaging in counter-insurgency to collect personal information and intercept 
communications on suspected targets in order to distinguish irregulars from 
non-combatants. 
In 3) and 7) a variety of intelligence collection operations, including coun-
ter-insurgent operations, regularly produce false-positives, interdicting innocent 
people mistaken for militants. A clearly concerning case is where the communica-
tions of innocent people might be collected and analysed when their out of context 
remarks trigger automated collection or where intelligence operations wrongly 
indicate that a particular person is a foreign intelligence officer, intelligence asset 
or an irregular militant. In a domestic law enforcement context, rights-infringing 
investigations of suspects (who turn out to be innocent) can sometimes be justified. 
State agents tasked with investigative functions cannot only interact with guilty 
persons or people of intelligence value. Agents’ mandate instead is to investigate 
suspects, people who might be innocent or might be guilty. Agents would not be 
meeting their protective duty if treating all suspects with the benign indifference 
they do apparently innocent people. Similarly, intelligence operations ill-serve 
the state if they are restricted to investigating known threats, to the exclusion of 
anticipating future threats. Investigations require some rights infringements like 
questioning, arrest, interrogation and searches. People in a just state, where state 
agents can be held accountable for bad behaviour, do not have their rights violated 
by security standard-compliant investigative actions since they can be modelled 
as consenting to security standard compliant norms and tactics aimed at protect-
ing their rights. The case is more complicated in international settings since the 
intelligence collector is not necessarily acting to secure the community of which 
the target is a part and the target likely will not have the ability to identify or sue 
the intelligence agents who wrong her. 
As an expression of their duty to support just institutions, inhabitants of one 
state cede claim-rights against having some of their information collected diag-
nostically by an adversary agency in order to ascertain if they are a security threat. 
This diagnostic level of collection would seem to be the minimal requirement 
of a duty to support just foreign security institutions. All people have a right to 
demand that their security agents identify looming threats. Ceding a right against 
diagnostic collection is a way to support this right enjoyed by foreigners. So, intel-
ligence agencies may be justified – contingent on meeting the practical elements 
of the security standard – in conducting automated dragnet signal interception of 
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region is digitally scanned for certain security sensitive references prior to select 
communication being forwarded to a human analyst for consideration. Metadata 
recording and retention may also be justified for the same reason. Agencies might 
want to retain years’ worth of big data in order to have a library to scan if current 
investigations highlight an old communication as being of significance. Agency 
leaders might model inhabitants of their states accepting the risk that their adver-
saries will store their old communications but never view them – unless the adver-
sary finds evidence that a citizen is actually a spy or a terrorist – as a cost of their 
own agencies doing the same thing in a fraught security environment. Inhabitants 
of states without major security concerns could not be modelled as accepting this 
risk. The cost to civilians is steeper, and potentially less tolerable, if an adversary 
had very sloppy selection algorithms and so fed a large number of false-positive 
communications to human analysts. Still, even this cost is perhaps tolerable since 
the foreign analyst presumably reads an anonymized text or email. By contrast, 
the cost might be unbearable if the adversary’s diagnostic efforts involved read-
ing every written communication or listening to every conversation as a matter 
of course. Businesses might fear intercepted and stored communications more 
than individuals. Even if an agency is reasonably sure its rival does not engage 
in industrial espionage, it has to consider if domestic business actions would be 
harmed because of executives’ fears that sensitive communications  could be inter-
cepted and misused or leaked. 
A further point for agency leaders to consider on the subject of big data collec-
tion might relate more to the retention, rather than the collection, of the data. The 
cost to average citizens and businesses is greatly increased if intelligence agencies 
store their intercepted data on relatively insecure servers and then hackers steal 
the data and make it available in a searchable database. One might not worry 
much if one’s online searches and texts are stored on an NSA or MSS server in 
some desert, never to be read unless one starts corresponding with jihadists, but 
worry very much if that information is available on a website prospective employ-
ers, spouses and divorce attorneys can search for a modest fee. 
Due process protections can help make domestic criminal investigations secu-
rity standard-compliant. People can demand to be protected from criminals and 
have crimes against them promptly solved, but innocent people also do not want 
to be regularly inconvenienced or frightened by ham-handed investigations and 
so would endorse checks on investigators by neutral arbiters to help ensure that 
investigations are warranted. Appealing to the reciprocal element of the security 
standard, inhabitants of one state would endorse due process style protections 
appropriate for domestic undercover work for foreign intelligence targets if their 
agencies needed to move beyond the diagnostic phase to target a particular per-
son the initial diagnosis suggested was a threat. Graduated due process protec-
tions are important since the same standards inhabitantsA could be modelled as 
endorsing could guide collection efforts targeting them on behalf of inhabitants. 
Some due process protections involved in an overt domestic investigation such 
as those involving arrest and interrogation are not apt since the target will not 
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the requirement of a warrant from a neutral court prior to engaging in collection 
against foreign civilian targets. Collectors would have to produce evidence that 
the desired target is a person of intelligence value. The court should view foreign 
intelligence targets as having the same privacy rights as domestic inhabitants, be 
it with respect to their physical person, their possessions, their communications or 
their data. This requirement would extend to targets who are suspected of being 
civilian intelligence officers operating outside security-sensitive areas like intel-
ligence agency headquarters and embassies. 
Intelligence agencies might also take an interest in politicians, diplomats and 
civilians working in sensitive industries. Their work product on their computers 
and work-related communications are fair game for interception if they pose a 
potential threat to other states. These professionals can be modelled as waiving 
claim-rights against having work-related communications and devices targeted 
(posing a risk of collaterally capturing personal communication) since they vol-
untarily took jobs where they pose indirect threats to adversaries or are part of 
a state’s overall foreign policy establishment. Security training likely regularly 
reminds them of what is at stake in their communications. Moreover, they should 
choose to be scrupulous in separating personal from professional communication. 
The harder question is whether they have ceded claim-rights to all their per-
sonal data. Intelligence agencies might very much want to gather embarrassing 
or incriminatory information against a politician, diplomat, or defence contractor 
in order to blackmail him or find out personal information about him in order to 
improve a recruiting officer’s ability to develop rapport. I suggested earlier that 
the security standard would likely not permit targeting service personnel in this 
manner because the reciprocal cost is too high. Cost is relative, so it would be 
more accurate to say that the cost of inviting universal collection against one’s 
own military usually outweighs the benefit of collecting against random service 
personnel. The benefit of collecting damaging information against select politi-
cians, diplomats or weapons scientists is far greater. Further, the number of people 
targeted is relatively small. Politicians and diplomats can be trained about the 
risks of extracurricular indiscretions and provided with relatively secure devices. 
Politicians in democracies are also partially vetted during campaigns as their 
opponents try to identify and publicize any damaging information. In many cases, 
scandals foreign intelligence agencies might discover have already been revealed 
to voters. 
Scientists and other researchers working very closely on weapons or intel-
ligence gathering technology can perhaps be modelled as waiving claim-rights 
against having personal information targeted since they likely know or should 
know the tactics of adversary agencies and the importance those agencies place 
on the scientists’ work. It seems a heavy cost to researchers working on more 
peripheral research, perhaps on defence or intelligence grants, if their funding 
comes with a risk that all their personal information will be potentially collected 
and exploited by foreign intelligence agencies. Here, leaders of agencies would 
have to think very carefully if the security environment warrants reciprocal inva-
sions of domestic researchers’ privacy. 
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 Intentionally intercepting the communication or records of friends, relatives 
and lovers of all the aforementioned categories is fraught. To be clear, this tac-
tic involves separate targeting of a target’s familiars, not incidentally collecting 
against them in the course of intercepting the target’s communications. Intelli-
gence agencies may seek personal information that could be used to blackmail 
targets regarding their relatives’ foibles or to reveal vulnerabilities or proclivities 
that intelligence officers might otherwise exploit in order to cultivate the person 
as a spy. Intelligence officers might also offer incentives to targets to help rela-
tives in distress. 
 First, relatives of service members, intelligence officers, weapons researchers 
etc. have not waived rights in the role-based manner of their relatives. Have they 
forfeited their rights by being complicit in their relative’s actions? One cannot 
help what career one’s child, parent or sibling chooses, but what about a spouse? 
The spouse of a service member knows about his or her spouse’s profession, but 
an intelligence officer might never reveal his true profession to his spouse or at 
least not until after they are married. Bearing in mind that reciprocal element of 
the security standard, it seems too high a bar to demand divorce as the price of 
avoiding being targeted for intelligence collection. Still appealing to this recipro-
cal element, intelligence officers have to consider if they are willing to have their 
own relatives targeted for intelligence collection prior to targeting their potential 
assets’ relatives. Such targeting violates the targets’ rights. Except perhaps in the 
most perilous security environments, it seems the reciprocal element would pre-
clude targeting relatives. 
Finally , an international criminal like a drug dealer, a pirate or an unprivileged 
irregular combatant ,11 whose operational communications are intercepted, does 
not have his moral rights violated wherever he is located because he lacks a right 
to contribute to criminal operations via those communications. However, since his 
identity is likely not overt, the collecting agency has to go through due process 
steps of getting a warrant prior to targeting him. Failure to do so would violate the 
target’s rights even if he really was a criminal. 
 The foregoing argument assumes that targets live in decent states with function-
ing governments engaging in national security work on behalf of their inhabitants. 
Unprivileged irregulars and other types of criminals sheltering in failed or unjust 
states have no more of a right to secret operational communications than they 
do if they are operating in just states. Service personnel and intelligence officers 
serving unjust regimes are effectively serving criminal organizations and so, like 
ordinary criminals, forfeit a right to their operational communications. Defence 
contractors or weapon scientists in unjust states may be closer to criminals if they 
are knowingly colluding with an unjust regime. Those who are coerced by their 
repressive governments are wronged by being targeted for collection since they 
have not forfeited their rights through culpable collaboration. Agencies in other 
states need to appeal to the doctrine of double effect or lesser evil arguments in 
order to justify wronging these groups of people. 
 Service personnel, intelligence officers and defence contractors presumably are 
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just foreign institutions as a way of respecting foreigners’ rights. This duty means 
ceding claim-rights against diagnostic and accidental collection, but not collat-
eral collection. Collateral collection occurs when an agent foresees that collecting 
against a target will also capture information from a target’s interlocutors even 
though they are not intelligence targets. My view is that minimal diagnostic col-
lection meant to ascertain if one is a security threat is included in the duty to sup-
port just foreign institutions, but collateral collection is only justified via a waiver 
consequent to entering into an agent-mediated adversarial practice. A waiver of 
rights against collateral collection is entailed by a modelled endorsement of one’s 
agents engaging in collection efforts collaterally collecting on foreigners. Agency 
leaders can model this consent if or so long as it is technologically impossible to 
only collect against one member of a conversation. Thus, this justification does 
not extend to non-targets in failed or unjust states because these people lack intel-
ligence agents working on their behalf against foreign adversaries. 
One might think that non-targets living in unjust states have a duty to help 
protect foreigners from the non-targets’ unjust leaders. Yet non-complicit civil-
ians in unjust states are like hostages, victims of their own leaders and potentially 
threatened by adversaries as well. Their duties cannot extend beyond those of 
non-targets living in just or decent states. They are wronged by collateral collec-
tion. Agencies would have to appeal to the doctrine of double effect or make a 
lesser evil argument to justify violating these people’s rights. 
Collateral collection is permissible if it will ultimately contribute to rudimen-
tary law enforcement benefiting non-targets like the interdiction of terrorists or 
drug dealers in a failed or unjust state. In that case, innocent people in the target 
area can be modelled as ceding claim-rights to any agency that will act in the 
interest of their rights when local criminals are removed from the scene. 
Notes 
1 Gendron, Pfaff, Diderichsen and Vrist Ronn make the same point in rejecting direct 
application of just war theory to intelligence operations ( Gendron 2005 , 418;  Pfaff 
2006 , 75;  Diderichsen and Rønn 2017 , 482). 
2 Pfaff and Tiel also use a social contract framework ( Pfaff and Tiel 2004 , 4). 
3 For example, an egalitarian norm will exclude certain tactics that focus only on certain 
ethnic groups. 
4 I make an argument for this position in Chapter 7 of my  The Moral Status of Combat-
ants: A New Theory. 
5 The latter can be effectuated by voluntarily entering into a practice involving certain 
well-known concessions on the parts of members. For example, one tacitly consents to 
abide by the rules of a game when one voluntarily begins playing, even if those rules 
might force one to suffer some harm or loss. When one loses a hand in poker, one can-
not object that “I wasn’t playing  that sort of poker”. 
6 Though, for example, one ought not to subvert foreign elections by posting disinforma-
tion on the internet. 
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8 Pfaff and Tiel base the permission to engage in diagnostic collection on tacit consent. 
Their position is vulnerable to standard critiques of John Locke’s famous account of 
political obligation based on tacit consent. Namely, one can ask how tacit consent 
obtains if citizens are never provided with the express terms of the “contract” and do 
not have meaningful refusal options. 
9 The adversary agency’s permission does not mean agencies in the target state are not 
permitted to oppose their actions. 
10 See An Ethics of Interrogation, Chapter 7. 
11 An irregular combatant is a combatant who uses guerrilla tactics and/or represents a 
non-state group (often then using guerrilla tactics). An unprivileged irregular is one 
who fails the criteria for moral and lawful belligerency: obeying a unified chain of 
command, carrying one’s arms in the open, wearing identifying emblems, and obeying 
the laws and customs of war. 
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